![Who killed Mozi? Lastly placing the IoT zombie botnet in its grave Who killed Mozi? Lastly placing the IoT zombie botnet in its grave](https://techtoguide.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Who-killed-Mozi-Finally-putting-the-IoT-zombie-botnet-in.jpeg)
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ESET Analysis
How ESET Analysis discovered a kill swap that had been used to take down one of the crucial prolific botnets on the market
01 Nov 2023
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3 min. learn
![Who killed Mozi? Finally putting the IoT zombie botnet in its grave](https://web-assets.esetstatic.com/tn/-x425/wls/2023/2023-11/mozi/mozi-iot-botnet-kill-switch-eset-research.jpeg)
In August 2023, the infamous Mozi botnet, notorious for exploiting vulnerabilities in a whole bunch of hundreds of IoT gadgets annually, skilled a sudden and unanticipated nosedive in exercise. First noticed in India on August 8th, 2023 and every week later in China on August 16th, this mysterious disappearance stripped Mozi bots of most of their performance.
![Figure 1. Sudden drop in Mozi activity globally (top), in India (middle), and in China (bottom) Figure 1 Sudden drop in Mozi activity globally (top), in India (middle), and in China (bottom)](https://web-assets.esetstatic.com/wls/2023/2023-11/mozi/figure-1-sudden-drop-in-mozi-activity-globally-top-in-india-middle-and-in-china-bottom.png)
Our investigation into this occasion led us to the invention of a kill swap on September 27th, 2023. We noticed the management payload (configuration file) inside a consumer datagram protocol (UDP) message that was lacking the standard encapsulation of BitTorrent’s distributed sloppy hash desk (BT-DHT) protocol. The particular person behind the takedown despatched the management payload eight occasions, every time instructing the bot to obtain and set up an replace of itself through HTTP.
The kill swap demonstrated a number of functionalities, together with:
- killing the father or mother course of, i.e., the unique Mozi malware,
- disabling some system providers corresponding to sshd and dropbear,
- changing the unique Mozi file with itself,
- executing some router/machine configuration instructions,
- disabling entry to varied ports (iptables -j DROP), and
- establishing the identical foothold because the changed unique Mozi file
We recognized two variations of the management payload, with the most recent one functioning as an envelope containing the primary one with minor modifications, corresponding to including a perform to ping a distant server, most likely meant for statistical functions.
Regardless of the drastic discount in performance, Mozi bots have maintained persistence, indicating a deliberate and calculated takedown. Our evaluation of the kill swap reveals a powerful connection between the botnet’s unique supply code and not too long ago used binaries, and likewise using the right non-public keys to signal the management payload (see Determine 2).
![Figure 2. Code snippets of the original Mozi sample (left) vs kill switch sample seen in 2023 (right) Figure 2 Code snippets of the original Mozi sample (left) vs kill switch sample seen in 2023 (right)](https://web-assets.esetstatic.com/wls/2023/2023-11/mozi/figure-2-code-snippets-of-the-original-mozi-sample-left-vs-kill-switch-sample-seen-in-2023-right.png)
![Figure 3. Control flow diagram of the original Mozi sample (left) vs kill switch sample seen in 2023 (right) Figure 3 Control flow diagram](https://web-assets.esetstatic.com/wls/2023/2023-11/mozi/figure-3-control-flow-diagram.png)
This leads us to the speculation suggesting two potential originators of this takedown: the Mozi botnet creators, or Chinese language regulation enforcement forcing the cooperation of the creators. The sequential focusing on of bots in India after which in China means that the takedown was carried out intentionally, with one nation focused first and the opposite every week later.
![Figure 4 Mozi timeline](https://web-assets.esetstatic.com/wls/2023/2023-11/mozi/figure-4-mozi-timeline.png)
The demise of one of the crucial prolific IoT botnets is a captivating case of cyberforensics, offering us with intriguing technical data on how such botnets within the wild are created, operated, and dismantled. We’re persevering with to research this case and can publish an in depth evaluation within the coming months. However for now, the query stays: Who killed Mozi?
For any inquiries about our analysis printed on WeLiveSecurity, please contact us at threatintel@eset.com.
ESET Analysis gives non-public APT intelligence reviews and knowledge feeds. For any inquiries about this service, go to the ESET Risk Intelligence web page.
IoCs
Recordsdata
SHA-1 |
Filename |
Detection |
Description |
758BA1AB22DD37F0F9D6FD09419BFEF44F810345 |
mozi.m |
Linux/Mozi.A |
Unique Mozi bot. |
9DEF707F156DD4B0147FF3F5D1065AA7D9F058AA |
ud.7 |
Linux/Mozi.C |
Mozi bot kill swap. |
Community
IP |
Area |
Internet hosting supplier |
First seen |
Particulars |
157.119.75[.]16 |
N/A |
AS135373 EFLYPRO-AS-AP EFLY NETWORK LIMITED |
2023-09-20 |
Kill swap internet hosting server |
MITRE ATT&CK strategies
This desk was constructed utilizing model 13 of the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
Tactic |
ID |
Identify |
Description |
Useful resource Growth |
Purchase Infrastructure: Digital Personal Server |
The Mozi kill swap operators rented a server at eflycloud.com to host the replace recordsdata. The Mozi kill swap operators rented a number of servers that ship payloads on BT-DHT networks. |
|
Preliminary Entry |
Exploit Public-Going through Utility |
The Mozi kill swap operators despatched an replace command to Mozi purchasers on a BT-DHT community. |
|
Persistence |
Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: RC Scripts |
The kill swap creates a number of scripts, corresponding to /and many others/rc.d/rc.native, to determine persistence. |
|
Exfiltration |
Exfiltration Over Various Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
The kill swap sends an ICMP ping to the operator maybe for the aim of monitoring. |
|
Impression |
Service Cease |
The kill swap stops the SSH service and blocks entry to it with iptables. |
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