Scarabs colon-izing weak servers

3 November 2023

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On this blogpost, ESET researchers check out Spacecolon, a small toolset used to deploy variants of the Scarab ransomware to victims everywhere in the world. It most likely finds its approach into sufferer organizations by its operators compromising weak internet servers or through brute forcing RDP credentials.

A number of Spacecolon builds include numerous Turkish strings; subsequently we suspect a Turkish-speaking developer. We have been in a position to monitor the origins of Spacecolon again to not less than Could 2020 and proceed to see new campaigns on the time of writing, with the newest construct compiled in Could 2023. Regardless of this monitoring and our detailed evaluation of Spacecolon’s constituent instruments, we can’t presently attribute its use to any identified risk actor group. Due to this fact, we are going to name Spacecolon’s operators CosmicBeetle to characterize the hyperlink to “house” and “scarab”.

Spacecolon consists of three Delphi parts – internally generally known as HackTool, Installer, and Service, which will likely be known as ScHackTool, ScInstaller, and ScService on this blogpost. ScHackTool is the principle orchestrator element, which permits CosmicBeetle to deploy the opposite two. ScInstaller is a small element with a single function: to put in ScService. ScService acts as a backdoor, permitting CosmicBeetle to execute customized instructions, obtain and execute payloads, and retrieve system info from compromised machines.

Moreover these three parts, Spacecolon’s operators rely closely on a big number of third-party instruments, each respectable and malicious, that Spacecolon makes out there on demand.

Whereas getting ready this report for publication, we noticed a brand new ransomware household being developed, with samples being uploaded to VirusTotal from Turkey. We imagine with excessive confidence that it’s written by the identical developer as Spacecolon; subsequently we’ll seek advice from it as ScRansom. Our attribution relies on related Turkish strings within the code, utilization of the IPWorks library, and the general GUI similarity. ScRansom makes an attempt to encrypt all onerous, detachable and distant drives utilizing the AES-128 algorithm with a key generated from a hardcoded string. Now we have not noticed ScRansom being deployed within the wild on the time of writing and we imagine it’s nonetheless within the growth stage. The most recent variant uploaded to VirusTotal is bundled inside an MSI installer, along with a small utility to delete Shadow Copies.

Key factors of this blogpost:

CosmicBeetle operators most likely compromise internet servers weak to the ZeroLogon vulnerability or these whose RDP credentials they can brute pressure.

Spacecolon offers, on demand, a big number of third-party, pink group instruments.

CosmicBeetle has no clear focusing on; its victims are everywhere in the world.

Spacecolon can function a RAT and/or deploy ransomware; we now have seen it delivering Scarab.

Spacecolon operators or builders seem like getting ready the distribution of recent ransomware that we now have named ScRansom.

Overview

The identify Spacecolon was assigned by Zaufana Trzecia Strona analysts, who authored the primary (and to our data the one different) publication (in Polish) in regards to the toolset. Constructing on high of that publication, ESET provides deeper perception into the risk. To keep away from confusion, we are going to seek advice from the toolset as Spacecolon and to its operators as CosmicBeetle.

The assault state of affairs is as follows:

1. CosmicBeetle compromises a weak internet server or just brute forces its RDP credentials.

2. CosmicBeetle deploys ScHackTool.

3. Utilizing ScHackTool, CosmicBeetle employs any of the extra third-party instruments out there on demand to disable safety merchandise, extract delicate info, and achieve additional entry.

4. If the goal is deemed useful, CosmicBeetle can deploy ScInstaller and use it to put in ScService.

5. ScService offers additional distant entry for CosmicBeetle.

6. Lastly, CosmicBeetle could select to deploy the Scarab ransomware via ScService or manually.

In a number of circumstances, we seen ScService being deployed via Impacket moderately than ScInstaller, with ScHackTool not used in any respect. We conclude that utilizing ScHackTool because the preliminary element is just not the one strategy Spacecolon’s operators make use of.

The ultimate payload CosmicBeetle deploys is a variant of the Scarab ransomware. This variant internally additionally deploys a ClipBanker, a kind of malware that screens the content material of the clipboard and adjustments content material that it deems is prone to be a cryptocurrency pockets deal with to an attacker-controlled one.

Preliminary acces

ESET telemetry means that some targets are compromised through RDP brute forcing – that is additional supported by the extra instruments, listed in Appendix A – Third-party instruments utilized by the attacker, out there to Spacecolon operators. Moreover that, we assess with excessive confidence that CosmicBeetle abuses the CVE-2020-1472 (ZeroLogon) vulnerability, primarily based on a customized .NET device described within the subsequent part.

With low confidence, we assess that CosmicBeetle might also be abusing a vulnerability in FortiOS for preliminary entry. We imagine so primarily based on the overwhelming majority of victims having gadgets operating FortiOS of their surroundings and that the ScInstaller and ScService parts reference the string “Forti” of their code. In response to CISA, three FortiOS vulnerabilities have been amongst the highest routinely exploited vulnerabilities in 2022. Sadly, we now have no additional particulars on such potential vulnerability exploitation apart from these artifacts.

Closing the door behind you

On a number of events, ESET telemetry has proven Spacecolon operators executing a customized .NET payload that we’ll seek advice from right here as ScPatcher. ScPatcher is designed to do nothing malicious. Quite the opposite: it installs chosen Home windows Updates. The checklist of updates put in is illustrated in Desk 1 and the corresponding code a part of ScPatcher in Determine 1.

Desk 1. Listing of Home windows Updates put in by ScPatcher

Replace ID	Platform	Remark
KB5005389	Home windows 8	Addresses CVE-2021-33764.
KB4601357	Home windows 8	Addresses ZeroLogon.
KB4601349	Home windows 8.1	Addresses ZeroLogon.
KB4576750	Home windows 10	No clear CVE connection.
KB955430	Home windows Vista Home windows Server 2008	No clear CVE connection.
KB4571746	Home windows 7 Home windows Server 2008	No clear CVE connection.
KB5006749	Home windows 7 Home windows Server 2008	No clear CVE connection.
KB4601363	Home windows 7 Home windows Server 2008	Addresses ZeroLogon.
KB5005112	Home windows 10 Home windows Server 2019	No clear CVE connection.

Figure_01_UpdaterUrls — *Determine 1. A part of ScPatcher code itemizing the chosen Home windows updates*

ScPatcher additionally comprises two features designed to drop and execute:

· replace.bat, a small BAT script to change Home windows Automated Updates settings, and

· up.vbs, an nearly similar copy of an official MSDN instance script to obtain and set up Home windows Updates with the slight change of not accepting person enter, however moderately permitting the updates to proceed mechanically and silently.

Whereas these two features will not be referenced anyplace within the code, ESET telemetry reveals Spacecolon operators executing each scripts instantly via Impacket. The features are illustrated in Determine 2 and Determine 3.

Figure_02_UpdateBat — *Determine 2. ScPatcher code liable for dropping and executing a BAT script to change Automated Home windows Replace settings*

Figure_03_UpdateVbs — *Determine 3. ScPatcher code liable for dropping and executing a VBScript to obtain and set up Home windows Updates*

Victimology

Now we have not noticed any sample in Spacecolon victims apart from them being weak to the preliminary entry strategies employed by CosmicBeetle. Determine 4 illustrates the Spacecolon incidents recognized by ESET telemetry.

Figure_05_RansomMessage01 — *Determine 4. Distribution of Spacecolon victims*

Now we have not discovered any sample within the targets’ space of focus or dimension both. To call just a few, we now have noticed Spacecolon at a hospital and a vacationer resort in Thailand, an insurance coverage firm in Israel, a neighborhood governmental establishment in Poland, an leisure supplier in Brazil, an environmental firm in Turkey, and a college in Mexico.

Technical evaluation

We first take a short take a look at the ransomware variant Spacecolon deploys after which proceed with the evaluation of Spacecolon parts themselves.

Scarab ransomware

Scarab is Delphi-written ransomware. It comprises notable code overlaps with the Buran and VegaLocker households. It depends on an embedded configuration whose format is sort of similar to that of the Zeppelin ransomware. That configuration determines, amongst different issues, the file extension for encrypted recordsdata, filenames, checklist of file extensions of recordsdata to encrypt, and the ransom message.

The overwhelming majority of Scarab builds we now have encountered drop and execute an embedded Delphi-written ClipBanker that screens the clipboard content material and replaces any string resembling a cryptocurrency pockets with an attacker-controlled one, particularly one of many following:

· 1HtkNb73kvUTz4KcHzztasbZVonWTYRfVx

· qprva3agrhx87rmmp5wtn805jp7lmncycu3gttmuxe

· 0x7116dd46e5a6c661c47a6c68acd5391a4c6ba525

· XxDSKuWSBsWFxdJcge8xokrtzz8joCkUHF

·4BrL51JCc9NGQ71kWhnYoDRffsDZy7m1HUU7MRU4nUMXAHNFBEJhkTZV9HdaL4gfuNBxLPc3BeMkLGaPbF5vWtANQnt2yEaJRD7Km8Pnph

· t1RKhXcyj8Uiku95SpzZmMCfTiKo4iHHmnD

We have been in a position to conclusively hyperlink Spacecolon with not less than two Scarab builds using .flycrypt and .restoreserver extensions for encrypted recordsdata – CosmicBeetle tried to execute these builds on machines that had been compromised by Spacecolon shortly beforehand. Each builds observe the identical file-naming patterns – the ransomware runs as %APPDATApercentosk.exe and the embedded ClipBanker as %APPDATApercentwinupas.exe. This naming holds particular significance for Spacecolon, as ScHackTool expects two such named processes to be operating. Supposing this naming sample is carefully tied to Spacecolon, greater than 50% of Scarab configurations proven by ESET telemetry could also be associated to Spacecolon. The ransom messages for the 2 conclusively linked samples are illustrated in Determine 5 and Determine 6.

*Determine 5. Scarab ransom message for the .flycrypt variant*

Figure_06_RansomMessage02 — *Determine 6. Scarab ransom message for the .restoreserver variant*

ScHackTool

ScHackTool is the principle Spacecolon element utilized by its operators. It depends closely on its GUI and the lively participation of its operators; it permits them to orchestrate the assault, downloading and executing further instruments to the compromised machine on demand as they see match.

From right here on, we are going to seek advice from a number of GUI parts in the identical approach as they’re outlined by the Delphi programming language – Labels, TextBoxes, GroupBoxes, and so forth.

ScHackTool employs a neat anti-emulation trick. When executed, a faux error message pops up (see Determine 7). If the “OK” button is clicked, ScHackTool terminates. One must double-click on the “g” within the phrase “reinstalling” (highlighted in pink) to truly show the principle window.

Figure_07_Smokescreen — *Determine 7. Faux error message displayed when ScHackTool is executed*

Earlier than the principle window is displayed, ScHackTool obtains a textual content file, checklist.txt, from its C&C server. This file defines what further instruments can be found, their related names, and URLs from which to obtain them. An instance of such a file is proven in Determine 8. All Spacecolon parts, together with ScHackTool, use the IPWorks library for community communication.

CAT|TOOLS
Defender#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/def.zip#folder
Transportable#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/Transportable.zip#folder
Spacemonger#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/SpaceMonger.zip#folder
Eraser#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/EraserPortable.zip#folder
Nmap#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/nmap-7.92-setup.zip#folder
Disk Instruments#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/disktools.zip#folder
Netscan#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/netscan.zip#folder
APS#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/APS.zip#folder
SuperScan#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/superscan.zip#folder
Autoruns#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/AutorunsPortable.zip
uLow Stage#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/HDDLLF.4.40.zip#folder
Avfucker#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/avfucker.zip#folder
Veracrypt#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/VeraCryptPortable.zip#folder
Dcrypt#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/dcrypt_setup_1.2_beta_3_signed.zip#folder
Afterwork#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/_AfterWork.zip#folder
BAT#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/BAT.zip#folder
CAT|PRIV
NirsoftPass#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/move/passrecenc.zip#folder
IObitUnlocker#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/IObitUnlockerPortable.zip
Mimikatz#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/priv/mimikatz_trunk.zip#folder
AutoMimikatz#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/priv/mimiauto.zip
AccountRestore#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/priv/Accountrestore.zip
Bruter 1.1#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/priv/Bruter_1.1.zip#folder
NL#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/priv/nl.zip#folder
WORDLIST#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/wl.zip#folder
Advrun#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/priv/advancedrun-x64.zip#folder
WPR#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/move/wpr_setup.zip#folder
EPDR#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/move/epdr.zip#folder
NPRW#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/move/nprw.zip#folder
Card Recon#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/move/cardrecon.zip#folder
Radmin Bruter#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/priv/radminbrute.zip#folder
Pstools#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/priv/PSTools.zip#folder
RDP Recognizer#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/move/rdprecognizer.zip#folder
PWRPISO#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/move/PRWP.zip#folder
CAT|RAAG
USBView#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/usbdeview-x64.zip#folder
LastActivityViewer#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/LastActivityView.zip#folder
Pview#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/pwd_view.zip#folder
NGROK#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/r/ngrok.zip
AGENT#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/agent.zip#folder
SUB|Sniffer
Fiddler Sniffer#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/sniffer/FiddlerSetup.zip#folder
CAIN#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/priv/ca_setup.zip#folder
Interceptor#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/sniffer/Intercepter-NG.v1.0+.zip#folder
CAT|Others
MREMOTE#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/different/mRemoteNG-Transportable-1.76.20.24669.zip#folder
Vmware VRC#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/vmrc.zip#folder
Winlogon#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/winlogonview.zip
Filezilla Transportable#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/FileZillaPortable.zip
Sqlmanager Mini#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/move/sqlmanager.zip
SMM#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/SSMS-Setup-ENU.zip#folder
Dbbrowser#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/move/dbbrowser.zip
VCJRENET#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/different/VCJRE.zip#folder
Chrome#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/GoogleChromePortable.zip#folder
Winrar#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/winrar.zip#folder
7z#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/different/7z.zip#folder
SUB|Exploit
Metasploit#https://193.149.185.23/instruments/exploit/metasploitframework-latest.zip

Determine 8. An instance of the checklist.txt file that ScHackTool makes use of to arrange further instruments

Earlier than explaining the method of parsing this file, allow us to briefly introduce ScHackTool’s GUI. It consists of three important tabs (Obtain, Instruments, and MIMI Dump) and a backside panel shared amongst all three of them. Because the Obtain tab is populated by the results of the parsing course of, let’s introduce it first alongside the parsing logic.

Obtain tab

This tab is populated by buttons that give the operators the power to obtain and execute further instruments. All these instruments can be found as password-protected ZIP archives (password: ab1q2w3e!). All of them are downloaded to ./zip/<ARCHIVE_NAME> and extracted into ./<ARCHIVE_NAME_WITHOUT_ZIP>/. The downloaded archives will not be eliminated by ScHackTool.

What further instruments can be found is outlined by the aforementioned checklist.txt file. The parsing of this file is pretty easy. It’s learn line by line. If a line seems to be like CAT|<NAME> (most likely brief for “Class”), then a brand new GroupBox named <NAME> is created and all following entries are related to it. Equally, if a line seems to be like SUB|<NAME> (seemingly brief for “Subcategory”), then a brand new horizontal Label named <NAME> is added to the present class.

All different strains are thought-about to be precise entries. The road is break up by # into two or three gadgets:

1. the device identify,

2. the URL used to retrieve the device, and

3. an non-compulsory suffix.

For each entry, a button titled because the device identify is created. Moreover, if the non-compulsory suffix is a folder, a further button titled AC is created; this button merely opens Home windows Explorer on the device’s extracted location.

If the checklist.txt file is just not out there, the malware quits. Moreover, if Spacecolon operators request a device that’s outlined in checklist.txt, however is just not out there on the related URL, the ScHackTool course of will get caught and stops responding.

As you’ll be able to see in Determine 9, one or two buttons are created for every device. TOOLS, PRIV, RAAG, and Others (highlighted in pink) characterize the classes, and Sniffer and Exploit (highlighted in blue) are the subcategories. A listing of all of the out there further instruments alongside their descriptions are listed in Appendix A – Third-party instruments utilized by the attacker.

Figure_09_AvailableTools — *Determine 9. The Obtain tab itemizing further instruments out there to obtain from the C&C server*

Instruments tab

One is perhaps eager to assume that that is the principle tab, but it surely in actual fact is just not. Surprisingly, a lot of the buttons do nothing (their related OnClick features are empty). Traditionally, we all know these buttons did work, however over time, their performance has been eliminated. We offer an outline of the no-longer-functioning buttons later within the blogpost. Determine 10 illustrates the GUI and Desk 2 summarizes the performance of working buttons.

Figure_10_ToolsTab — *Determine 10. Instruments tab of ScHackTool*

Desk 2. Listing of useful buttons within the Instruments tab

Button	Remark
Keyboard EN	Change the person language settings. That is finished by executing a PowerShell script (activity.ps1) via a BAT script (a.bat). The particular PowerShell instructions executed are: · $LanguageList = Get-WinUserLanguageList · $LanguageList.Add(“en-US”) · Set-WinUserLanguageList $LanguageList -force
Kill OSK	Execute taskkill.exe /f /im osk.exe. As talked about earlier, that is the filename below which the Scarab ransomware is executed.
Winup	Execute taskkill.exe /f /im winupas.exe. As talked about earlier, that is the filename below which the ClipBanker (related to the Scarab ransomware) is executed.
Cobian UI Move	Execute Cobian UI Move, a freeware backup device, whereas eradicating its configuration first. Word that this device is just not downloaded by Spacecolon. The method consists of simply these two steps: · Delete C:Program Information (x86)Cobian Backup 11SettingscbEngine.ini · Execute C:Program Information (x86)Cobian Backup 11cbInterface.exe
Add	Add a brand new account with administrative rights. Username and password are specified within the TextBoxes to the left (highlighted in pink).
PW GEN	Generate a random alphanumeric string within the TextBox to the left (size is specified within the TextBox below it). Highlighted in inexperienced.
Dec	Decrypt a hardcoded string and show it within the TextBox labeled Str. Highlighted in purple. Word: The Enc button does nothing.

Earlier we acknowledged that the deployed Scarab ransomware and its related ClipBanker are named osk.exe and winupas.exe. As is clear from Desk 2, the 2 related buttons can be utilized to terminate these processes.

The world highlighted in pink is crammed in when ScHackTool launches. Nonetheless, no precise machine info is retrieved; Spacecolon operators have to fill it in manually.

MIMI Dump tab

The performance on this tab was a part of the Instruments tab, however was ultimately moved to a separate tab. As soon as once more, a number of the buttons don’t work. The UI is illustrated in Determine 11, and Desk 3 summarizes the performance of the working buttons.

Desk 3. Listing of useful buttons within the MIMI Dump tab

Button	Remark
Ship	Add a file to the C&C server. The steps are: 1. Take the file from the TextBox labeled Dump. 2. Create a duplicate and identify it lsa.file (or lsass.dmp in older builds). 3. Retailer this file into dump.zip. 4. Add dump.zip to the C&C server. 5. Open a file named lastlog.txt in Notepad. ° The file might be created by the underlying IPWorks library that implements the switch.
Parse	Obtain two textual content recordsdata from the C&C server and paste one into the Person and the opposite into the Move TextArea.
Downloaded	Present a MessageBox with the checklist of instruments already downloaded to the machine (see Determine 12).

Figure_12_InstalledToolsMsgBox — *Determine 12. The MessageBox that lists all of the instruments already out there on the compromised system when the Downloaded button is clicked*

The identify of this tab would recommend that it’s carefully tied to the notorious password and credential-extracting device Mimikatz, however in actual fact it’s not. Whereas the file that’s despatched again to the Spacecolon C&C is known as to recommend a lsass.exe dump, the file have to be created manually by the operators, and it may be any arbitrary file. Equally, the downloaded usernames and passwords will not be utilized in any approach until copied by the operators.

Nonetheless, Mimikatz is a part of the set of further instruments supplied by Spacecolon (see Appendix A – Third-party instruments utilized by the attacker).

Backside panel

The underside panel, shared amongst all three tabs, permits CosmicBeetle to schedule a system restart, take away Spacecolon from the system, and entry PortableApps, one of many further instruments. The Obtain and Zip progress bars correspond to the obtain and power archive extraction progress, respectively. An outline of the buttons’ performance is supplied in Desk 4.

Desk 4. Listing of the buttons within the backside panel shared between the three tabs, and their functionalities

Button	Remark
OPEN	Execute ./Transportable/begin.exe.
CLOSE	Execute · taskkill.exe /f /im PortableAppsPlatform.exe · taskkill.exe /f /im nl.exe · taskkill.exe /f /im advanced_port-scanner.exe
DELETE	Take away all recordsdata and folders recursively from the applying’s location. Additionally execute taskkill.exe /f /im PortableAppsPlatform.exe.
Folder	Open Home windows’ File Explorer within the software’s location.
R	Schedule a system restart.
A	Abort scheduled system restart.

String encryption

ScHackTool encrypts strings with a easy algorithm – we offer the decryption routine carried out in Python in Determine 13. Not the entire strings are encrypted, although with newer builds, the variety of protected strings will increase.

def decrypt_string(s: str, key: str) -> str:
    dec = ""
    for b in bytearray.fromhex(s):
        dec += chr(b ^ (key >> 8))
        key = (0xD201 * (b + key) + 0x7F6A) & 0xFFFF
 
    return dec

Determine 13. String decryption routine for SCHackTool strings

ScHackTool buttons – a visit again in time

ScHackTool is certainly the element that has undergone probably the most adjustments. The oldest construct we have been capable of finding is from 2020 and makes use of TicsDropbox for communication with its C&C server. At the moment, as a substitute of the faux error message, a password safety mechanism (see Determine 14) was in place (password: dd1q2w3e).

Figure_14_LoginUI — *Determine 14. Password-protection window in an outdated variant of ScHackTool*

Weirdly, with every new model, some buttons stopped working (their code was fully eliminated). By having the ability to peek into these older builds, we are able to be taught the performance of the no-longer-functional buttons, that are listed in Desk 5.

Desk 5. A listing of button functionalities primarily based on evaluation of older builds

Button	Remark
Keyboard EN	Was named Keyboard TR with the plain change in performance.
DEFENDER OFF	Used to drop and execute scripts from the .rsrc part. These scripts at the moment are a part of the BAT and Avfucker further instruments listed in Appendix A – Third-party instruments utilized by the attacker.
Cease Service	Used to drop and execute a script to terminate companies and processes. This script is now a part of the BAT further device, and the checklist of companies and processes is supplied in Appendix B – Listing of terminated Processes and companies.
Kill All (Default)	Used to kill all processes contained inside a hidden checklist of the Delphi type construction. Whereas the code is now not current, the checklist is and is offered in Appendix C – Processes killed by Kill All (Default) button.
Del Shadow Log	Used to drop and execute scripts to delete Shadow Copies, delete Home windows Occasion Logs, and modify boot choices. These scripts at the moment are a part of the BAT device listed in Appendix A – Third-party instruments utilized by the attacker.
Latest Information	Used to drop and execute a small script that removes all recordsdata situated at: · %APPDATApercentMicrosoftWindowsRecentAutomaticDestinations* · %APPDATApercentMicrosoftWindowsRecentCustomDestinations* · %APPDATApercentMicrosoftWindowsRecent*
Credssp	Used to switch the settings of the Credential Safety Help Supplier (CredSSP) by issuing the next command (most likely to beat potential RDP connection points): reg add “HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersion PoliciesSystemCredSSPParameters” /f /v AllowEncryptionOracle /t REG_DWORD /d 2
Button5	Encrypt a hardcoded URL and paste it to the Edit1 TextBox. This button might be a predecessor of the Enc and Dec buttons. Unusually, the Dec button presently works whereas Enc doesn’t.
Button20	Shut the faux error message displayed on startup. This conduct could be very unusual, as on the level when the button may very well be clicked, the error message now not exists. Certainly, clicking this button causes ScHackTool to crash.

ScInstaller

ScInstaller is a really small Delphi device designed to do a single activity: set up ScService. ScService is saved in ScInstaller’s .rsrc part, encrypted with the AES algorithm utilizing a key derived from the password TFormDropbox.btnUploadClick.

ScInstaller is a part of the extra instruments the attacker could or could not make the most of, particularly the one named AGENT (see Appendix A – Third-party instruments utilized by the attacker). Regardless of the most recent noticed construct coming from 2021, that construct remains to be a part of the toolset on the time of writing. Nonetheless, we now have noticed ScService put in manually via Impacket, and, whereas we now have noticed new builds of ScService, we now have seen no new builds of ScInstaller. This may increasingly recommend ScInstaller is now not actively used.

The sooner variants of ScInstaller merely put in and ran ScService on execution. The more moderen variants include a GUI (see Determine 15). ScService is put in provided that the Set up button is clicked.

Figure_15_InstallerUI — *Determine 15. ScInstaller GUI*

In addition they include just a few further options. The Verify button on the backside verifies whether or not ScService is put in and retrieves the service standing. The Verify button on the high left is used to verify connectivity to 4 hardcoded C&C servers (no precise information is exchanged). ScInstaller additionally drops its personal TLS certificates in a PFX file named cert.pfx or cdn.pfx and guarded by the password dd1q2w3e. This certificates is used when connecting to the C&C server(s).

TextBoxes labeled Forti IP and Not are used to create a small INI file with two entries – Knowledge and Word, crammed by these two values, respectively. This INI file is merely utilized by CosmicBeetle to retailer customized notes in regards to the sufferer. It performs a minor position in C&C communication described within the subsequent part.

ScService

In March 2023, presumably as the results of the Zaufana Trzecia Strona evaluation revealed in early February 2023, ScService underwent a notable growth change. Let’s first take a look at its earlier variant after which talk about the 2023 adjustments.

ScService, because the identify suggests, is a element run as a Home windows service and acts as a easy backdoor. The service parameters are proven in Desk 6. The service description was taken from the official respectable Home windows Sensor Monitoring Service.

Desk 6. ScService parameters

Parameter	Worth
DisplayName	Server storage monitoring service
ServiceName	UpdateStorServ
Description	Displays numerous sensors with the intention to expose information and adapt to system and person state. If this service is stopped or disabled, the show brightness is not going to adapt to lighting situations. Stopping this service could have an effect on different system performance and options as nicely.

As with ScInstaller, ScService additionally drops a customized TLS certificates, similar to the one utilized by ScInstaller. If the INI file (created by ScInstaller) is just not current, one with empty values is created.

As soon as launched, ScService creates three timers, one every that:

1. sends a KEEP message to the C&C server each 10 seconds,

2. flushes the DNS cache each 5 hours by executing ipconfig /flushdns, and

3. connects to the C&C server each 5 minutes.

Determine 16 demonstrates the usage of the customized certificates when establishing a connection to the C&C server. ScService makes use of a number of C&C servers, all hardcoded and encrypted within the binary.

Figure_16_CertificateUsage — *Determine 16. Use of customized certificates upon connecting to the C&C server*

Other than establishing a TLS connection, ScService communicates with the C&C server through TCP on port 443. The protocol could be very easy; no further encryption is employed. As soon as ScService receives information, it scans the information for identified command names and executes any such command, optionally sending again a response. ScService acknowledges the six instructions proven in Desk 7. Command identify and its parameters are delimited by #. In brief, ScService can execute arbitrary instructions and executables, open and shut an SSH tunnel, acquire machine data, and replace the INI file.

Desk 7. TCP/IP instructions functionality

Command	Response	Remark
CMD#<CMD_TO_EXEC>	RESULT#CMD#<CMD_TO_EXEC_RESULT>	Execute <CMD_TO_EXEC> through cmd.exe.
DETAILS#GET	RESULT#DETAILS#<OS>#<UPTIME>#<REMOTE_HOST>#<INI_CONTENT>	Add compromised machine data: · <OS> = OS identify · <UPTIME> = Uptime (retrieved through the GetTickCount API) · <REMOTE_HOST> = The C&C server it’s linked to · <INI_CONTENT> = Content material of the INI file
SETNOTE#<NOTE>	N/A	Set <NOTE> because the content material of the Word subject within the INI file.
TUNNEL#<HOST>#<PORT>#<USER>#<PWD>#<SRC_PORT>#<DST_PORT>	OK : TUNNEL	Opens an SSH tunnel to the compromised machine for the attacker. Connects to a vacation spot through SSH carried out by TScSSHClient. Connects to <HOST> at <PORT> utilizing username <USER> and password <PASS> and instructs <HOST> to pay attention on <SRC_PORT> and ahead the communication. Evidently <DST_PORT> is just not used correctly.
DISCONNECT	N/A	Disconnect the connection arrange by the TUNNEL command.
DOWNEXEC#<URL>#<FILE>#<FLAG>	N/A	Obtain from <URL> to <FILE>. If <FLAG> equals 1, execute the <FILE>.

March 2023 redesign

As we already hinted, ScService underwent a notable change in March 2023. To start with, the service parameters modified barely, preserving an analogous sample (see Desk 8).

Desk 8. Up to date ScService parameters

Parameter	Worth
DisplayName	Diagnostic Occasion System
ServiceName	StorageDataServ
Description	The Diagnostic Occasion System is utilized by the Diagnostic Coverage Service to occasion diagnostics that have to run in a Native Service context.

The way in which that compromised machine data is obtained modified. ScService runs a neighborhood HTTP server on port 8347 accepting a single request – /standing. ScService then points this request to the server. The dealing with of this request is easy: it retrieves machine info and returns it because the content material of the HTTP response. The info is formatted in a approach that it may be saved in an INI file – which is exactly what occurs: ScService shops the content material into its INI file. The collected info is:

· OS = working system identify

· CN = pc identify

· DO = person area

· LIP = native IP addresses

Many (not all) strings at the moment are encrypted utilizing the AES-CBC algorithm with a key derived from the password 6e4867bb3b5fb30a9f23c696fd1ebb5b.

The C&C protocol modified. Apparently, the unique C&C communication protocol stays carried out, however is barely used when instructed by the CONNECT command (see beneath) to speak with a goal. The brand new important C&C protocol makes use of HTTP as a substitute of TCP. The next HTTP headers are used:

· Person-Agent = Mozilla/5.0 (Home windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:41.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/41.0

· UNID = hexlified MD5 hash of MAC deal with and C: drive serial quantity

Moreover, a Session cookie is added with its worth being the beforehand collected machine info saved as OS, CN, DO, and LIP, joined by # and encoded by base64.

Instructions are in JSON format (see Determine 17 beneath).

{
    “Standing”: “TASK”,
    “CMD”: “<COMMAND_NAME>”,
    “Params”: “<COMMAND_PARAMS_STR>”,
    “TaskID”: “<TASK_ID>”
}

Determine 17. Instance of JSON-formatted command

The Standing subject is at all times equal to TASK, whereas the CMD and Params fields outline the command identify and parameters. Lastly, the TaskID worth is used to ship the duty consequence, if any, to the C&C server. Supported instructions are listed in Desk 9.

Desk 9. HTTP(S) instructions functionality of ScService

Command	Parameters	Remark
CONNECT	<HOST>:<PORT>	Hook up with a C&C server. Makes use of the outdated TCP communication protocol.
TUNNEL	<HOST>#<PORT>#<USER>#<PWD>#<SRC_PORT>#<DST_PORT>	The identical as in TCP variant.
TUNNELCLOSE	N/A	The identical as DISCONNECT in TCP variant.
DOWNEXEC	<FLAG>#<URL>#<FILE>	The identical as in TCP variant (notice that the arguments’ order has modified).
USERADD	<USERNAME>#<PASSWORD>	Add a brand new administrator account with given username and password.

Conclusion

On this blogpost, we now have analyzed Spacecolon, a small Delphi toolset used to push the Scarab ransomware to weak servers and its operators we name CosmicBeetle. Moreover, Spacecolon can present backdoor entry for its operators.

CosmicBeetle doesn’t make a lot effort to cover its malware and leaves loads of artifacts on compromised programs. Little to no anti-analysis or anti-emulation methods are carried out. ScHackTool depends closely on its GUI, however, on the similar time, comprises a number of nonfunctional buttons. CosmicBeetle operators use ScHackTool primarily to obtain further instruments of option to compromised machines and run them as they see match.

Spacecolon has been in lively use since not less than 2020 and is below ongoing growth. We imagine the authors made a considerable effort to attempt to evade detection in 2023, after the Zaufana Trzecia Strona publication got here out.

CosmicBeetle doesn’t select its targets; moderately, it finds servers with crucial safety updates lacking and exploits that to its benefit.

On the time of publication, we noticed a brand new ransomware household, which we now have named ScRansom, that could be very seemingly written by the developer of the Spacecolon parts. Now we have not seen ScRansom being deployed within the wild as of this writing.

For any inquiries about our analysis revealed on WeLiveSecurity, please contact us at threatintel@eset.com.
ESET Analysis provides non-public APT intelligence studies and information feeds. For any inquiries about this service, go to the ESET Risk Intelligence web page.

IoCs

Information

SHA-1	Filename	Detection	Description
40B8AF12EA6F89DB6ED635037F468AADEE7F4CA6	app.exe	Win32/Spacecolon.A	Spacecolon HackTool.
1CB9320C010065E18881F0AAA0B72FC7C5F85956	Taskmgr.exe	Win32/Spacecolon.A	Spacecolon HackTool.
EF911DB066866FE2734038A35A3B298359EDABCE	ap.exe	Win32/Spacecolon.A	Spacecolon HackTool.
0A2FA26D6EAB6E9B74AD54D37C82DEE83E80BDD7	ap.exe	Win32/Spacecolon.A	Spacecolon HackTool.
B916535362E2B691C6AEF76021944B4A23DDE190	ap.exe	Win32/Spacecolon.A	Spacecolon HackTool.
95931DE0AA6D96568ACEBC11E551E8E1305BF003	a.exe	Win64/Spacecolon.A	Spacecolon Installer.
6700AFB03934B01B0B2A9885799322307E3299D5	installer.exe	Win64/Spacecolon.A	Spacecolon Installer.
4B07391434332E4F8FAADF61F288E48389BCEA08	svcss.exe	Win64/Spacecolon.A	Spacecolon Service.
B9CF8B18A84655D0E8EF1BB14C60763CEFFF9686	svvc.exe	Win64/Spacecolon.A	Spacecolon Service.
E2EAA1EE0B51CAF803CEEDD7D3452577B6FE7A8D	1new.exe	Win32/Filecoder.FS	Scarab ransomware (.hazard variant).
8F1374D4D6CC2899DA1251DE0325A7095E719EDC	kkk.exe	Win32/Filecoder.FS	Scarab ransomware (.rdprecovery variant).
2E4A85269BA1FDBA74A49B0DF3397D6E4397DB78	Analyzer_sib.msi	Win64/DelShad.D	MSI installer of ScRansom
7AA1A41F561993C4CCA9361F9BAEF2B00E31C05D	Project1.exe	Win32/Filecoder.Spacecolon.A	ScRansom
7BC7EEAAF635A45BC2056C468C4C42CC4C7B8F05	Shadow.exe	Win64/DelShad.D	Utility to delete Shadow Copies

Community

IP	Area	Internet hosting supplier	First seen	Particulars
N/A	u.piii[.]web	Cloudflare	2022-01-25	Spacecolon C&C server.
3.76.107[.]228	N/A	AWS	2023-01-16	Spacecolon C&C server.
87.251.64[.]19	N/A	XHOST INTERNET SOLUTIONS	2021-11-08	Spacecolon C&C server.
87.251.64[.]57	up.awiki[.]org	XHOST INTERNET SOLUTIONS	2021-12-11	Spacecolon C&C server.
87.251.67[.]163	ss.688[.]org	XHOST INTERNET SOLUTIONS	2023-02-27	Spacecolon C&C server.
162.255.119[.]146	akamaicdnup[.]com	Namecheap, Inc.	2023-02-24	Spacecolon C&C server.
185.170.144[.]190	b.688[.]org	XHOST INTERNET SOLUTIONS	2021-11-21	Spacecolon C&C server.
185.202.0[.]149	sys.688[.]org	Web Applied sciences LLC	2020-12-16	Spacecolon C&C server.
193.37.69[.]152	replace.inet2[.]org	XHOST INTERNET SOLUTIONS	2023-03-03	Spacecolon C&C server.
193.37.69[.]153	up.vctel[.]com u.cbu[.]web replace.cbu[.]web	XHOST INTERNET SOLUTIONS	2021-12-11	Spacecolon C&C server.
193.149.185[.]23	N/A	BL Networks	2023-05-31	Spacecolon C&C server.
206.188.196[.]104	cdnupdate[.]web	BL Networks	2023-01-16	Spacecolon C&C server.
213.232.255[.]131	N/A	SEMIBAND LLC	2021-12-19	Spacecolon C&C server.

Paths the place Spacecolon is normally put in

· %USERPROFILEpercentMusic

· %ALLUSERSPROFILE%

Names of customized accounts arrange by CosmicBeetle

· help

· IIS

· IWAM_USR

· BK$

Mutexes created by Scarab ransomware

· {46E4D4E6-8B81-84CA-93DA-BB29377B2AC0}

· {7F57FB1B-3D23-F225-D2E8-FD6FCF7731DC}

MITRE ATT&CK methods

Tactic	ID	Identify	Description
Reconnaissance	T1595.002	Energetic Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning	CosmicBeetle appeared for weak servers as potential targets.
Useful resource Improvement	T1583.001	Purchase Infrastructure: Domains	CosmicBeetle used numerous internet hosting suppliers to register domains.
	T1587.001	Develop Capabilities: Malware	CosmicBeetle developed its personal malware.
	T1587.003	Develop Capabilities: Digital Certificates	ScService and ScInstaller use a customized SSL certificates in TLS communications.
Preliminary Entry	T1190	Exploit Public-Going through Software	CosmicBeetle exploited ZeroLogon, and possibly different vulnerabilities, to compromise programs.
Execution	T1059.003	Command and Scripting Interpreter: Home windows Command Shell	CosmicBeetle executed many instructions utilizing cmd.exe. Most of the moreover downloaded instruments are BAT scripts.
	T1059.001	Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell	ScHackTool makes use of PowerShell to carry out numerous duties.
	T1059.005	Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visible Primary	Most of the moreover downloaded instruments are VBScripts.
	T1053.005	Scheduled Activity/Job: Scheduled Activity	ScService makes use of scheduled duties to execute payloads.
Persistence	T1133	Exterior Distant Companies	CosmicBeetle tried to brute pressure credentials that have been then used to enter.
	T1547.001	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder	ScHackTool and the Scarab ransomware make the most of the Run or RunOnce key for persistence.
	T1136.001	Create Account: Native Account	CosmicBeetle usually created its personal administrator account.
	T1543.003	Create or Modify System Course of: Home windows Service	ScService is carried out as a Home windows service.
Protection Evasion	T1078.003	Legitimate Accounts: Native Accounts	CosmicBeetle could deploy a big number of instruments to crack or brute pressure credentials for native accounts.
	T1140	Deobfuscate/Decode Information or Data	Spacecolon parts make use of a number of sorts of knowledge obfuscation.
	T1070.001	Indicator Elimination: Clear Home windows Occasion Logs	CosmicBeetle could deploy a big number of instruments to clear Home windows Occasion Logs.
	T1036.005	Masquerading: Match Reputable Identify or Location	Scarab ransomware makes an attempt to cover by naming its processes as respectable Home windows course of names.
	T1218.005	System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta	Scarab ransomware makes use of mshta.exe to carry out numerous duties.
Credential Entry	T1110.001	Brute Pressure: Password Guessing	CosmicBeetle could deploy a big number of instruments designed to brute pressure passwords.
	T1110.003	Brute Pressure: Password Spraying	CosmicBeetle could deploy a big number of instruments designed to check numerous passwords.
	T1003.001	OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Reminiscence	CosmicBeetle could deploy instruments able to dumping lsass.exe.
Discovery	T1082	System Data Discovery	ScService queries system info to fingerprint the sufferer.
	T1016	System Community Configuration Discovery	ScService retrieves the native community configuration and MAC deal with.
	T1124	System Time Discovery	ScService retrieves the system time.
Assortment	T1560.002	Archive Collected Knowledge: Archive through Library	ScHackTool makes use of the usual ZIP library to archive recordsdata earlier than extracting them to the C&C server.
Assortment	T1115	Clipboard Knowledge	Scarab ransomware deploys a ClipBanker that screens the clipboard for cryptocurrency wallets, and adjustments them.
Command and Management	T1071.001	Software Layer Protocol: Internet Protocols	Spacecolon parts talk through HTTPS.
	T1132.001	Knowledge Encoding: Normal Encoding	ScService makes use of AES encryption.
	T1095	Non-Software Layer Protocol	Older ScService builds talk through a customized TCP/IP protocol.
	T1571	Non-Normal Port	New ScService builds run a neighborhood HTTP server on port 8347.
	T1090.002	Proxy: Exterior Proxy	ScService could also be instructed to make use of an exterior proxy.
Exfiltration	T1041	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	ScHackTool exfiltrates information to the C&C server.
Influence	T1485	Knowledge Destruction	CosmicBeetle could deploy a lot of instruments to destroy information on disks.
	T1486	Knowledge Encrypted for Influence	CosmicBeetle could deploy Scarab ransomware to encrypt delicate information.
	T1561	Disk Wipe	CosmicBeetle could deploy a lot of instruments to wipe disks.
	T1529	System Shutdown/Reboot	ScHackTool is able to rebooting the system.

Appendix A – Third-party instruments utilized by the attacker

The instruments within the following desk are ordered by identify. The “Device identify” column corresponds to the identify assigned to the device archive by the risk actor and the “Archive path” column lists the relative path of the device’s archive on the C&C server. The instruments on the very finish whose “Device identify” is about to “N/A” seek advice from instruments which are current on the C&C server, however not utilized by CosmicBeetle in any configuration identified to us. Lastly, some instruments appear to now not be current on the C&C server, although a button to request them nonetheless exists within the ScHackTool – that is mirrored by the “Remark” column being set to “N/A”.

Device identify	Archive path	Remark
7z	/instruments/different/7z.zip	7zip, a preferred archiving utility.
AccountRestore	/instruments/priv/Accountrestore.zip	A device used to enumerate customers and brute pressure their password. Talked about right here.
Advrun	/instruments/priv/advancedrun-x64.zip	AdvancedRun, a utility to execute recordsdata by NirSoft.
Afterwork	/instruments/_AfterWork.zip	Comprises: · CCleaner, the favored efficiency optimization device, and · ClearLocokay, a screen-locking utility.
AGENT	/instruments/agent.zip	Comprises: · ScInstaller, and · installer for distant entry device IntelliAdmin.
APS	/instruments/APS.zip	Superior Port Scanner, a port scanning utility.
AutoMimikatz	/instruments/priv/mimiauto.zip	N/A
Autoruns	/instruments/AutorunsPortable.zip	Autoruns Transportable, a preferred auto-start location monitor.
Avfucker	/instruments/avfucker.zip	Set of small scripts to: · delete Shadow Copies, and · disable Home windows Defender.
BAT	/instruments/BAT.zip	Comprises: · a set of scripts to: ° delete Shadow Copies, ° modify boot settings, ° delete Home windows Logs, and ° terminate a number of processes and companies (seek advice from Appendix B – Listing of terminated processes and companies). · Defender Management, a device to disable Home windows Defender.
Bruter 1.1	/instruments/priv/Bruter_1.1.zip	Bruter, a community login brute forcer.
CAIN	/instruments/priv/ca_setup.zip	N/A
Card Recon	/instruments/move/cardrecon.zip	Card Recon, a device for figuring out cost card information.
Chrome	/instruments/GoogleChromePortable.zip	Google Chrome internet browser.
Dbbrowser	/instruments/move/dbbrowser.zip	N/A
Dcrypt	/instruments/dcrypt_setup_1.2_beta_3_signed.zip	DiskCryptor, a device to encrypt disks.
Defender	/instruments/def.zip	StopDefender, a device to disable Home windows Defender.
Disk Instruments	/instruments/disktools.zip	Disk instruments toolkit, a set of instruments to control disks (together with wiping).
EPDR	/instruments/move/epdr.zip	N/A
Eraser	/instruments/EraserPortable.zip	Eraser Basic Transportable, a safe file-deletion and data-wiping utility.
Fiddler Sniffer	/instruments/sniffer/FiddlerSetup.zip	Fiddler, a preferred community debugging device.
Filezilla Transportable	/instruments/FileZillaPortable.zip	FileZilla Consumer Transportable, a preferred FTP consumer.
Interceptor	/instruments/sniffer/Intercepter-NG.v1.0+.zip	Interceptor-NG, a multifunctional community evaluation device.
IOBitUnlocker	/instruments/IObitUnlockerPortable.zip	IOBitUnlocker, a device to unlock entry to recordsdata blocked by a sure software.
LastActivityViewer	/instruments/LastActivityView.zip	LastActivityView, a device by NirSoft to view latest exercise.
LowLevel	/instruments/HDDLLF.4.40.zip	HDD LLF Low Stage Format Device, a utility for low-level onerous disk drive formatting.
Metasploit	/instruments/exploit/metasploitframework-latest.zip	Metasploit, a penetration testing framework.
Mimikatz	/instruments/priv/mimikatz_trunk.zip	The well-known password extraction device.
MREMOTE	/instruments/different/mRemoteNG-Transportable-1.76.20.24669.zip	mRemoteNG, a multi-protocol distant connections supervisor.
Netscan	/instruments/netscan.zip	NetworkScanner by SoftPerfect, an IPv4/IPv6 scanner.
NGROK	/instruments/r/ngrok.zip	N/A
NirsoftPass	/instruments/move/passrecenc.zip	Home windows Password Restoration Instruments, a set of password retrieval instruments by NirSoft.
NL	/instruments/priv/nl.zip	NLBrute, an RDP brute-forcing device.
Nmap	/instruments/nmap-7.92-setup.zip	Nmap, a utility for community discovery and safety auditing.
NPRW	/instruments/move/nprw.zip	N/A
Transportable	/instruments/Transportable.zip	PortableApps.com, a bundle of assorted transportable purposes.
Pstools	/instruments/priv/PSTools.zip	PsTools, a set of command line instruments for Home windows by Sysinternals.
Pview	/instruments/pwd_view.zip	Password Viewer, a utility to unmask passwords hidden in PasswordBox fields.
PWRPISO	/instruments/move/PRWP.zip	Reset Home windows Password, a password restoration device.
Radmin Bruter	/instruments/priv/radminbrute.zip	N/A
RDP Recognizer	/instruments/move/rdprecognizer.zip	N/A
SMM	/instruments/SSMS-Setup-ENU.zip	SQL Server Administration Studio by Microsoft.
Spacemonger	/instruments/SpaceMonger.zip	SpaceMonger, a device for preserving monitor of free house on disks.
Sqlmanager Mini	/instruments/move/sqlmanager.zip	N/A
SuperScan	/instruments/superscan.zip	Superscan, a port scanner by Foundstone.
USBView	/instruments/usbdeview-x64.zip	USBDeview, a USB machine viewer by NirSoft.
VCJRENET	/instruments/different/VCJRE.zip	Comprises: · JRE for Java 8.0.3110.11, · Microsoft .NET Framework 4.8.04115.00, · Microsoft Visible C++ 2015-2022 Redistributable (x64) – 14.30.30704, · Microsoft Visible C++ 2015-2022 Redistributable (x86) – 14.30.30704, · Microsoft Visible C++ 2012 Redistributable (x64) – 11.0.61030, · Microsoft Visible C++ 2013 Redistributable (x64) – 12.0.40664, · Microsoft Visible C++ 2013 Redistributable (x86) – 12.0.40664, · Microsoft Visible C++ 2013 Redistributable (x64) – 12.0.30501, and · Microsoft Visible C++ 2013 Redistributable (x86) – 12.0.30501.
Veracrypt	/instruments/VeraCryptPortable.zip	VeraCrypt Transportable disk encryption software program.
Vmware VRC	/instruments/vmrc.zip	N/A
Winlogon	/instruments/winlogonview.zip	WinLogOnView by NirSoft.
Winrar	/instruments/winrar.zip	WinRAR, a preferred archiver device.
WORDLIST	/instruments/wl.zip	N/A
WPR	/instruments/move/wpr_setup.zip	Passcape Home windows Password Restoration, a device to retrieve passwords from person accounts.
N/A	/instruments/FastCopyPortable.zip	FastCopy Transportable, a utility for quick copying and deletion.
N/A	/instruments/IObitUninstallerPortable.zip	IObitUninstaller Transportable, a utility for uninstalling purposes.
N/A	/instruments/clearev.zip	Comprises: · a set of scripts to: ° delete Home windows Occasion Logs, and ° delete Shadow Backups. · ScreenLock (additionally contained within the Afterwork archive).
N/A	instruments/different/dbeaver-portable-win64-21.0.5-43-setup.exe	DBeaver, a database administration device.

Appendix B – Listing of terminated processes and companies

AcronisAgent
AcrSch2Svc
Apache2
avpsus
BackupExecAgentAccelerator
BackupExecAgentBrowser
BackupExecDiveciMediaService
BackupExecJobEngine
BackupExecManagementService
BackupExecRPCService
BackupExecVSSProvider
bes10*
black*
BMR Boot Service
CAARCUpdateSvc
CASAD2DWebSvc
ccEvtMgr
ccSetMgr
DefWatch
fbgu*
fdlauncher*
firebird*
firebirdguardiandefaultinstance
IBM Domino Diagnostics (CProgramFilesIBMDomino)
IBM Domino Server (CProgramFilesIBMDominodata)
IBM*
ibmiasrw
IISADMIN
Intuit.QuickBooks.FCS
McAfeeDLPAgentService
mfewc
mr2kserv
MsDtsServer110
MsDtsSrvr*
MSExchangeADTopology
MSExchangeFBA
MSExchangeIS
MSExchangeSA
msmdsrv*
MSSQL$ISARS
MSSQL$MSFW
MSSQLFDLauncher
MSSQLServerADHelper100
MSSQLServerOLAPService
MySQL
mysql*
mysqld.exe
NetBackup BMR MTFTP Service
orac*
PDVFSService
postg*
QBCFMonitorService
QBFCService
QBIDPService
QBPOSDBServiceV12
QBVSS
QuickBooksDB1
QuickBooksDB10
QuickBooksDB11
QuickBooksDB12
QuickBooksDB13
QuickBooksDB14
QuickBooksDB15
QuickBooksDB16
QuickBooksDB17
QuickBooksDB18
QuickBooksDB19
QuickBooksDB2
QuickBooksDB20
QuickBooksDB21
QuickBooksDB22
QuickBooksDB23
QuickBooksDB24
QuickBooksDB25
QuickBooksDB3
QuickBooksDB4
QuickBooksDB5
QuickBooksDB6
QuickBooksDB7
QuickBooksDB8
QuickBooksDB9
ReportingServicesService*
ReportServer
ReportServer$ISARS
RTVscan
sage*
SavRoam
ShadowProtectSvc
Merely Accounting Database Connection Supervisor
sophos
SPAdminV4
SPSearch4
SPTimerV4
SPTraceV4
SPUserCodeV4
SPWriterV4
sql
SQL Backup Grasp
SQL Server (MSSQLServer)
SQL Server Agent (MSSQLServer)
SQL Server Evaluation Companies (MSSQLServer)
SQL Server Browser
SQL Server FullText Search (MSSQLServer)
SQL Server Integration Companies
SQL Server Reporting Companies (MSSQLServer)
sql*
SQLAgent$ISARS
SQLAgent$MSFW
SQLAGENT90.EXE
SQLBrowser
sqlbrowser.exe
sqlservr.exe
SQLWriter
sqlwriter.exe
stc_raw_agent
retailer.exe
vee*
veeam
VeeamDeploymentService
VeeamNFSSvc
VeeamTransportSvc
VSNAPVSS
WinDefend
YooBackup
YooIT
Zhudongfangyu

Appendix C – Processes killed by Kill All (Default) button

Names of processes that was terminated by the Kill All (Default) button:

app.exe
ApplicationFrameHost.exe
blnsvr.exe
cmd.exe
conhost.exe
csrss.exe
dllhost.exe
dwm.exe
explorer.exe
LogonUI.exe
lsass.exe
msdtc.exe
openvpn-gui.exe
Project1.exe
rdpclip.exe
RuntimeBroker.exe
SearchUI.exe
companies.exe
ShellExperienceHost.exe
sihost.exe
smss.exe
spoolsv.exe
svchost.exe
taskhost.exe
taskhostex.exe
taskhostw.exe
tasklist.exe
Taskmgr.exe
vmcompute.exe
vmms.exe
w3wp.exe
wininit.exe
winlogon.exe
wlms.exe
WmiPrvSE.exe

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